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In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States of America embarked 
upon a major counter-terrorism campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates. The conflict 
has involved ground combat operations in Afghanistan, as well as ancillary actions in 
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. In all of these theaters, the use of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) has increased dramatically; in recent years, armed UAVs have been 
used to conduct strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. 
The rapid growth of UAV operations shows no sign of slowing, and the 
implications of their use need to be continually examined if the United States wishes to 
achieve its policy objectives in Pakistan and Yemen. Comparing these cases will help 
bring together knowledge gained in studying each case separately. This thesis 
investigates how the use of UAVs as part of the counter-terrorism campaigns in Yemen 
and Pakistan has affected U.S. relations with those countries and whether the current 
arrangements are the best policies to combat terrorism in these countries.  
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A. RISE OF THE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States of America 
embarked upon a major counter-terrorism campaign directed against al Qaeda and its 
affiliates. Officially dubbed the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), it is also been called, 
more appropriately, “the Long War,” and that is how it will be referred to here. The 
conflict has involved ground combat operations in Afghanistan, as well as ancillary 
actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, which are largely comprised of Special Forces 
actions and targeted strikes. In all of these theaters, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) has increased dramatically over the years. The U.S. UAV inventory before the 
war in Afghanistan numbered in the low hundreds; today there are over 7000 in the fleet, 
with more delivered every day.1 More commonly known to the public as ‘“Drones,” the 
aircraft do not have a pilot onboard. They are controlled via a satellite link by a “pilot” 
and sensor operator, who can be almost anywhere in the world.2 These aircraft have been 
used for reconnaissance and in recent years have taken on an armed role, being used in 
Yemen and Pakistan (among other countries) generally against high-level al Qaeda 
targets.  
The American employment of lethal force in UAV operations outside a 
designated war zone has raised a number of ethical and legal questions. Such issues 
rarely restrain the actions of states who believe they are defending themselves, but are 
more important nonetheless because they influence the political framing of counter-
terrorism as an element in the general relations of the countries involved. The rapid 
growth of UAV operations shows no sign of slowing, and the implications of their use, 
especially in Pakistan and Yemen, need to be continually examined if the United States 
                                                 
1. James DeShaw Rae, Analyzing the Drone Debates: Targeted Killing, Remote Warfare, and Military 
Technology (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 13. 
2. Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines: How to Think about Drones,” The Atlantic (September, 
2013): 61. 
 2
wishes to achieve its policy objectives with those states. Comparing the cases of Pakistan 
and Yemen will help bring together knowledge gained in studying each case separately. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the use of UAVs as part of the 
counter-terrorism campaigns in Yemen and Pakistan has affected U.S. relations with 
those countries. These two governments are important partners for combatting terrorist 
organizations within their borders, but even so it is noteworthy that they have decided to 
so readily cooperate with U.S. UAV operations. Continuing UAV campaigns in these 
countries may greatly depend on the methods that Pakistan and Yemen use to manage the 
impact of these actions on their own societies, their commitment to which may be 
indicative of their true willingness to cooperate with U.S. foreign political aims.  
Since the United States knows the major operating areas of al Qaeda and 
possesses the means to strike them directly, domestic politics prevent the adoption of a 
policy of U.S. non-intervention. American public opinion would likely not accept that the 
United States cannot take action against those who have attacked it because of the 
incapacity or reluctance of weaker states. That being so, the question arises whether the 
current arrangements between the United States and the Pakistani and Yemeni states are 
the best policy to combat terrorism in these countries. It is important to determine 
whether these partnerships are proving successful against al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups, or if policy changes could better support achieving American objectives.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Evaluating the changes in state-to-state relationships is not as simple as saying a 
relationship improved or declined. Certain factors, such as treaties, agreements, aid 
funding and military sales, support, and training, will provide some insight into the 
strength of a relationship. These factors will have net positive and negative effects on the 
relationships, though they will likely accrue differently to both sides and will likely 
benefit one side more than the other. It is possible that these political relationships over 
time will negatively affect the political aims of at least one side. 
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Given the turmoil in the regions in which UAVs are used, it would not be 
unreasonable to suppose that the effects of UAV use by the United States have caused 
certain political hardships for the governments of Yemen and Pakistan over the course of 
counter-terrorism operations within these countries. These hardships include popular 
civilian condemnation of U.S. strikes, anger with government cooperation with the 
United States, and increased recruiting support for the al Qaeda and Taliban 
organizations. These challenges may require Yemeni and Pakistani policy changes that 
impede cooperation with future counter-terrorism operations. 
The degree of open cooperation between these states is the most likely source of 
positive benefits to these relationships. If policy is geared toward supporting stable states, 
free from terrorist group operations, UAVs could be used to provide intelligence sharing 
between these states to combat terrorism. This would indicate a very strong, trusting 
relationship between these countries. In the current paradigm, however, with Yemen on 
the verge of collapse and the tumultuous relationships between Pakistani and American 
intelligence apparatuses, this seems less likely, especially in the near term.  
A certain level of negative effects will likely be acceptable to U.S. policy, so long 
as the net effect counters Al Qaeda’s ability to operate within these countries. This may 
be a policy, however, which is too short sighted, trading the instant gratification of 
targeted strikes with tacit state cooperation, for long-term destabilization which would 
benefit the terrorist organizations.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this thesis, I compare the use of force employing UAVs in Yemen and 
Pakistan, in order to determine what effects these policies have had on the political inter-
state relationships with these countries. There are differences between these two 
countries, but they are the best choice for this examination because they are the two 
centers of U.S. UAV activity in the world outside of a combat zone. Looking specifically 
at applications of UAVs outside of declared combat areas is important, since their use as 
a weapons system in combat operations falls in a different level of international politics. 
The interesting characteristics of UAVs seem to allow their use inside these countries 
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without as much controversy at the state-to-state level as would manned aircraft or 
ground forces. The state-to-state relationships that accommodate this sub-state level of 
conflict is the focus of this research, to try and explain this seeming government level 
permissiveness toward UAVs.  
Because this study is unclassified, the sources used to explore U.S. policy will be 
limited to the congressional record and other official publications, along with existing 
scholarship that has addressed the relationships between these countries, both before and 
after the implementation of UAV operations. With respect to the Yemeni and Pakistani 
side of the equation, there are two main factors at play: the governments’ official 
positions, and their society’s reactions to their relationships with the United States. 
Evaluating the societal effects of UAV use in these countries will rely largely on reports 
from people who have conducted field work in Pakistan and Yemen, and will have to be 
closely evaluated for bias and accuracy. There also is a significant quantity of news 
reporting that applies to these topics.  
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II. UNITED STATES UAV POLICY  
There is little question as to what event provided the catalyst for events that led to 
the first use of armed UAVs in countries like Yemen and Pakistan. The al Qaeda attacks 
of September 11, 2001 (9/11) invoked a Pearl Harbor-like response from the American 
government, armed forces, and public, with outpourings of support and strong desires for 
retribution against those responsible. These events, which brought the United States to 
the brink of armed UAV use, began with a conventional conflict in Afghanistan aimed at 
isolating the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda. From the beginning, however, American 
counter-terrorism was always conceived in global terms.  
A. THE 2001 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
In the days after 9/11, Congress quickly passed a resolution that President George 
W. Bush signed into law on the 18th of September, 2001 entitled the “Authorization for 
Use of Military Force” (AUMF). The law says: 
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 
by such nations, organizations or persons.3 
This law has been used extensively by both the Bush and Obama administrations to 
justify actions against terrorists, especially any al Qaeda branch or affiliate. Its first 
application was pursuing the sub-state group in Afghanistan being harbored by the 
Taliban government. Since there was no declaration of war between states, the action 
instead relies on the idea of non-international war between a state and a sub-state actor.4 
America has made this distinction against al Qaeda and continues to stress its legal right 
                                                 
3. Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001). 
4. Sikander Ahmed Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Legal and Socio-
political Aspects (New York: Routledge, 2015), 12. 
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to use military force (instead of strictly law enforcement actions) against the perpetrators 
of the 9/11 attacks.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE SELF-DEFENSE ARGUMENT 
The AUMF specifically states that the 9/11 attacks “render it both necessary and 
appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United 
States citizens both at home and abroad.”5 In addition, the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
passed resolutions condemning the attacks that referred to the U.S. right to individual or 
collective self-defense.6 These statements highlight the logic that justified using force in 
Afghanistan: America was attacked by a group that demonstrated it could attack from its 
training camps in Afghanistan and was expected to continue attacking in the absence of 
contrary action. This presents a “gray area” in the definition of self defense. The modern 
international paradigm as illustrated by the post-WWII formation of the UN is aimed at 
limiting instances of armed conflict by states, except in the exercise of the right to self-
defense.7 Engaging the forces of a state that harbors an extremist group could easily be 
considered aggressive behavior that goes against the UN charter.  
Calling the war in Afghanistan a case of self-defense is not all that controversial. 
The continued use of that same argument over time, however, especially to engage al 
Qaeda in countries that do not overtly harbor the group, does provide a source for 
controversy. The political moves by the United States in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks attempted to justify the U.S. position in such a way as to not draw a 
condemnatory response from the UNSC. In the process of developing customary 
international law, “the absence of challenge to the U.S. asserted right of self-defense 
could be taken to indicate acquiescence in an expansion of the right to include defense 
against governments that harbor or support organized terrorist groups that commit armed 
                                                 
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001). 
6. Myra Williamson, Terrorism, War, and International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force against 
Afghanistan in 2001 (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009), 192. 
7 Shah, International Law, 14. 
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attacks in other countries.”8 The outpouring of international support after the 9/11 attacks 
provided America with the opportunity to pursue this course of action and set the stage 
for future operations in Yemen and Pakistan to be framed from the perspective of 
exercising self-defense against al Qaeda. 
C. UAVS OR SOLDIERS? 
The decision to go after al Qaeda in Afghanistan—after the Taliban did not  
meet the unconditional U.S. demands to turn over those responsible for 9/11—resulted in 
a 13-year war in which 2355 U.S. servicemen and women died and over 20,000 were 
wounded in action.9 These were troops who were directly supporting operations to root 
out al Qaeda within the territorial bounds of Afghanistan. When the enemy would slip 
into areas beyond the immediate reach of U.S. forces, such as Pakistani and Yemeni 
tribal areas, the question became how to follow, track, and kill al Qaeda and Taliban 
members without violating state sovereignty and angering the countries needed to 
continue prosecuting this fight. 
Early on, armed UAVs were something of a novelty—a new tool that had never 
been used operationally. Before 2001, UAVs had been used for reconnaissance and, in 
the first Gulf War, for spotting the fall of shells from U.S. battleships.10 In the opening 
weeks of the Afghanistan campaign in November of 2001, an armed Predator was used 
to kill al Qaeda’s third-ranking military commander, Mohammed Atef.11 This was a 
proof of concept that UAVs were effective at conducting targeted strikes against specific 
individuals. In the next year, the Predator’s reach would extend outside a combat zone to  
 
 
                                                 
8. Frederick L. Kirgis, “Israel’s Intensified Military Campaign against Terrorism,” Insights 6, no. 19 
(2001), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/6/issue/19/israels-intensified-military-campaign-against-
terrorism.  
9. U.S. Department of Defense, “Casualty Numbers,” Defense.gov, accessed March 24, 2015, 
www.defense.gov/News/casualty.pdf. 
10. Ted Shelsby, “Iraqi Soldiers Surrender to AAI’s Drones,” Baltimore Sun, March 2, 1991, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com.  
11. John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, Drone Warfare (Malden: Polity Press, 2014), 19. 
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Yemen. The difference between the two strikes, as viewed by America, was the nature of 
the states in which they were carried out. Afghanistan had harbored terrorists, and the 
Taliban had direct links to the group that attacked America. Yemen had similar extremist 
groups operating within its borders that had also attacked U.S. assets, but contrary to 
Afghanistan, Yemen had agreed to support U.S. efforts immediately following 9/11. 
Yemen allowed U.S. intelligence to operate in the country to find the people responsible 
for the USS Cole (DDG-67) bombing. There was significant American public demand for 
justice for 9/11. There was not the same level of outcry after bombings in Kenya or the 
Cole attack.  
For this first non-combat strike, the White House and Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) would have weighed the political risks from a secretive UAV program that 
minimized in-country footprint against the risks of small Special Forces units on the 
ground to attempt capture. The official U.S. stance is that it prefers to capture terrorists, 
rather than to kill them, in order to interrogate them and exploit any information gained 
against future targets.12 This preference is tempered by the prospect of domestic political 
repercussions, which are lower when no American lives are at risk (especially when 
compared to operations designed to capture someone alive). Some even argue that in 
cases where the mission objectives are equal, such as air strikes, there is a moral 
obligation to use UAVs instead of accepting unnecessary risk to the life of a pilot in a 
conventional aircraft.13 While capturing and killing are different mission end states, this 




                                                 
12. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” May 23, 2013, the 
White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-
defense-university.  
13. Bradley Jay Strawser, Killing by Remote Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19–20.  
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Another factor leading into the initial UAV policy is still in play today, as 
indicated by President Obama in a speech at the National Defense University in 2013: 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most distant 
and unforgiving places on Earth…in some of these places—such as parts 
of Somalia and Yemen—the state only has the most tenuous reach into the 
territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action.14 
In this instance, the United States is evaluating the likelihood that a host state can 
effectively counter a threat to America or its interests. In the case of Afghanistan, when 
the Taliban offered to try Osama bin Laden in an Afghan court, the American response 
indicated that that would be insufficient to guarantee the future safety of the United States 
or the dismantling of al Qaeda’s network, as America had demanded.15 
In the end, the United States did conduct a UAV strike outside a combat zone in 
Yemen, where a ground presence would have likely caused greater consequences to U.S. 
policy. The UAV was also likely used due to its long endurance time (24 hours for the 
Predator) to confirm the target was correct, and due to the clandestine nature of the UAV 
program. These benefits in a simple single case scenario lead to a logical conclusion that 
UAVs should be the preferred tool for surgical, high-level target strikes aimed at 
degrading al Qaeda’s leadership. The subsequent chapters of this thesis will address the 
longer-term consequences of UAV use as applied to general U.S. policies in Yemen and 
Pakistan. 
 
                                                 
14. Obama, “National Defense University.”  
15. Williamson, Terrorism, 171. 
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III. YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 
A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The country of Yemen in some ways is an oddity in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
wider Persian Gulf region. The modern incarnation of government is a republic, which 
represents a deeply divided country. This type of government is relatively new for 
Northern Yemen, as it was a separate state governed by an Imam from the Zaydi sect (a 
group of Shi’a Muslims predominantly form northern Yemen) for over 1000 years, even 
as part of the Ottoman Empire. Shi’i Muslims account for approximately one-third of the 
current Yemeni population and remain centralized in the northwest portion of the 
country.16 The remainder of the country is predominantly Sunni, occupying the eastern 
and southern portions of the country, including the port city of Aden (see Figure 1).  
  
Figure 1.  Map of Yemen17 
                                                 
16. Lucas Winter, “Conflict in Yemen: Simple People, Complicated Circumstances,” Middle East 
Policy 18, no.1 (Spring 2011), 104. 
17. “Map of Yemen,” Bizbillia.com, Accessed March 24, 2015, http://travel.agency.bizbilla.com/map-
by-countries/allcountriesmaps/yemen-political-map.jpg.  
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North Yemen’s Imam was overthrown in 1962 in a coup d’etat that left the Shi’i 
minority in power and precipitated the North Yemen civil war. The war pitted the new 
government against tribal fighters who wished to restore the Imam. The government was 
supported by Egypt’s Gamal Nasser and was heavily influenced by Arab-nationalist 
ideas.18 The close ties with Egypt coupled with a disorganized tribal resistance allowed 
the government to maintain power and enforce its legitimacy in the Arabian Peninsula.  
South Yemen was a British protectorate and became independent in 1967. It 
immediately took on a Marxist character as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(DPRY) and courted support from the Soviet Union. The impending fall of the U.S.S.R. 
led the DPRY to merge with the North in 1990, to prevent the economic collapse and 
political isolation that could follow the loss of their patron state.19 The unified state 
would be run by Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had risen to power in North Yemen in 1978. 
Despite the poor tenures of the previous three North Yemen presidents (two were 
assassinated and one held the office for three weeks), Saleh managed not only to hold the 
office through the merger, but would be in the top government position until he was 
finally forced out in 2012.20 Saleh managed to expertly wield political power in the 
country; somehow managed to keep the tribes, southern separatists, and Zaydis appeased 
or controlled for over 30 years. This included the notable 1994 Civil War, where Saleh 
used a jihadi force in addition to his regular military to subdue the socialist South’s 
attempts to secede.21 He is often quoted as saying that balancing the many concerns in 
Yemen is akin to “dancing on the heads of snakes,”22 as if any political miss-step would 
have resulted in disaster. 
                                                 
18. W. Andrew Terrill, The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security (Carlisle, U.S. Army War 
College, 2011), 5. 
19. Ibid., 6. 
20. Ibid., 6–7. 
21. Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), 42. 
22. Terrill, Conflicts in Yemen, 8; Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 5. 
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B. AL QAEDA IN YEMEN 
The story of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is really the story of modern 
jihad. Yemen’s tradition of jihadis started when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 
For young men in the former North Yemen, participating in the war became something of 
a rite of passage.23 After the Soviets withdrew, many trained jihadis returned to their 
homes in Yemen, and Osama bin Laden realized he now had a force with which he could 
attempt to attain his goal, based on a portion of Islam’s Sahih Muslim Hadith: “Expel the 
Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula.”24 Bin Laden was furious when the 
Saudis allowed U.S. troops into the Kingdom as part of operation Desert Shield, instead 
of using his soldiers. He was kept in check in within the Kingdom’s limits by the royal 
family, so he instead created security problems in Yemen, such that in 1993 the Pentagon 
pulled all forces from Aden. The lesson bin Laden took from the experience was simple: 
“he did nothing in Saudi Arabia and the Americans stayed. But when he hit them in 
Yemen, they ran.”25 Al Qaeda would double down on these tactics, leading to 1998 
attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Yemen was used as a coordination 
base for the attacks.26 The organization would again target U.S. assets once they resumed 
visiting the Yemeni coast. 
1. USS Cole Bombing 
The port city of Aden is arguably the most important city in Yemen. It is a central 
hub of Yemen’s economy, and a stronghold of the southern Sunni community. In the 
most recent turmoil in the country, the government, as well as the embassies from all of 
the Gulf States (except Iran) moved there after Sana’a was taken over by Houthis.27 In 
                                                 
23. Johnsen, Last Refuge, 7. 
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late 2000, the destroyer USS Cole pulled into Aden for refueling and re-provisioning. 
During her visit, she was attacked by members of Al Qaeda, who used a small boat laden 
with explosives to blow a massive hole in the vessel’s side. Seventeen American sailors 
died, and the ship was nearly lost. U.S. ships no longer use Aden as a supply port. 
The attack was allegedly masterminded by Abu Ali al-Harithi, a leading 
lieutenant of Osama Bin Laden and the highest member of the al Qaeda branch in Yemen 
at the time.28 Al-Harithi was at the top of a CIA target list given directly to the Yemeni 
president in November of 2001 during his visit to Washington, DC.29 A U.S. policy was 
reiterated to the Yemeni delegation at this meeting that had been stated in President 
George W. Bush’s September 20, 2001, address to Congress “Every nation, in every 
region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists.”30 The CIA then began work with Yemen’s security service, the Political 
Security Office (PSO) in a combined manhunt would lead to the first armed drone strike 
outside of a warzone targeting a specific individual.  
2. The First Strike 
After the attacks of September 11th 2001, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
showed to what lengths the country was willing to go in order to combat al Qaeda and 
attempt to eliminate the threat it posed. Yemen was given a similar option as Afghanistan 
had been—cooperate and turn over the men on the CIA’s lists or it would draw U.S. 
direct intervention.31 Less than a year after Saleh’s trip to Washington, the U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA), working with the PSO, tracked one of al-Harithi’s phones to an 
area in Marib, 100 miles east of Sana’a. A UAV from the base in Djibouti was on station 
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within hours, and with President Saleh’s blessing, struck and killed al-Harithi and five 
others he had been meeting with on November 3, 2002.32  
Initially, Yemeni officials wanted to keep the attack secret, a condition to Saleh’s 
permission for the action, choosing to blame the deaths on an accidental detonation of 
explosives in the vehicle.33 Shortly after the strike, however, America broke that 
agreement when then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz referred to U.S. 
involvement in the explosion, saying it was: 
A very successful tactical operation…we’ve just got to keep the pressure 
on everywhere we’re able to, and we’ve got to deny the sanctuaries 
everywhere we’re able to and we’ve got to put pressure on every 
government that is giving these people support to get out of that 
business.34  
This announcement occurred two days before a U.S. midterm election, indicating 
that the Bush administration wanted to show a success against terrorism, and while UAVs 
were not specifically mentioned, the story had damaged the Yemeni plans for secrecy. 
Brig. Gen. Yahya M. Al Mutawakel, then deputy secretary general of the ruling People’s 
Congress party in Yemen, illuminates Yemeni frustration at U.S. arrogance in these 
interactions: “This is why we are reluctant to work closely with [the United States]. They 
don’t consider the internal circumstances in Yemen. In security matters, you don’t want 
to alert the enemy.”35  
Seemingly, the United States had used Yemen as a means to an end, and while 
some intelligence cooperation continued, no further UAV strikes would be carried out in 
the country for seven years.36 Al Qaeda would continue low level operations in the 
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country, but with Aden closed as far as the U.S. Navy was concerned, the terrorist threat 
was now someone else’s problem—al Qaeda shifted to Saudi Arabia.37 
C. AQAP, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
The important relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the 
United States is a contributing factor of American policy toward Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s 
role in global oil markets make it far more important to U.S. foreign policy decisions than 
Yemen’s strategic position on the Red Sea’s southern choke point, the Bab al Mandeb 
(“Strait of Tears”). One data point that illustrates the combined interests of KSA and the 
United States in Yemen played out in the UNSC in the lead up to the first Gulf War. 
After Saddam Husein invaded Kuwait, Saleh was reluctant to back the UNSC resolution 
condemning the occupation. This drew a warning from Saudi and American diplomats, 
indicating that “this will be the most expensive ‘no’ vote [Yemen] ever cast.”38 Within 
days of Yemen’s abstention, $70 million of U.S. aid was suspended and, by early 1991, at 
least 750,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from KSA.39 In a state whose economy 
relied in large part on foreign aid money and remittances, the blow from these losses 
showed how vulnerable Yemen was to foreign policies. This also cemented the 
importance of the Saudi regime in matters of Gulf security and cooperation, a lesson 
Yemen learned the hard way. 
Al Qaeda was and continues to be a major Saudi concern in the region. After 
falling from the U.S. field of view after the 2002 strike, al Qaeda elements from Yemen 
had begun a series of attacks in the Kingdom to the north. They targeted not only 
residential compounds occupied by Westerners working in the oil industry, but also 
government buildings and Saudi oil facilities.40 Saudi security forces cracked down hard 
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under the orders of then assistant interior minister, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (who is 
now Deputy Crown Prince of KSA, as well as minister of the interior).41 The prince’s 
aggressive stance made him a friend of both the Bush and then the Obama 
administrations.  
By 2009, the internal Saudi problem was largely contained, but Prince bin Nayef 
warned American diplomat Richard Holbrooke that Yemen was where al Qaeda would 
need to be dealt with next.42 The organization regrouped in Yemen in 2009 as Al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and had continued attempting operations against both 
countries. Bin Nayef explained that AQAP was gaining influence in the eastern tribal 
areas where the Yemeni state—president Saleh in particular—was losing influence.43 
Yemen was quickly progressing toward state failure. Given the widespread availability of 
arms and men in Yemen, al Qaeda elements there had provided the majority of 
manpower and weapons for operations inside KSA, justifying the Saudi’s continued 
concern.44 
Another actor driving Saudi and Yemeni politics are the Shi’a Houthi rebels from 
Northern Yemen, who have presented additional security problems for KSA. There have 
been several rounds of conflicts along the border the first directly between Yemen and 
the Houthis in 2003, the latest involving Saudi forces in 2010.45 In an effort to isolate this 
Shi’a group, Saudi Arabia has built a fence along their southern border and redeployed 
military and national guard forces to defend it.46 Former president Saleh came from the 
northern Zaydi sect and helped manage the effects of the Houthi groups in order to 
maintain some support from KSA. In the wake of Saleh’s ouster in 2012, and his 
replacement by former vice president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, himself a southerner, 
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the Houthi movement began again to grow. Their takeover of Sana’a and a majority of 
northern Yemen can only draw more Saudi attention.  
The Saudi’s have long suspected the Houthis of receiving support from the Shi’i 
government of Iran.47 In the recent turmoil, KSA has withdrawn its aid funding to 
Yemen, pending negotiations to stabilize the failing state.48 At the same time, while 
denying pre-takeover support, the new Houthi government has made agreements with 
Iran for a significant amount of aid for the Houthis, as well as engaging with Iran’s 
national airline to conduct direct flights to Sana’a.49 Whether there was Iranian 
involvement before the Houthi coup can be disputed; there certainly is now a significant 
interest by the Iranians in Northern Yemen, only adding to the tensions between the rival 
Gulf powers. 
D. THE ARAB SPRING AND POLITICAL TRANSITION 
Yemen faced a significant political transition, which the United States and KSA 
watched closely. Part of the wider Arab Spring movement which had begun in Tunisia, 
Yemenis began similar protests against the government and Saleh in particular, calling 
for the end of his 33-year reign. When Hosni Mubarak resigned, ending a 30-year 
dictatorship in Egypt, Yemeni protesters pressed harder for change. Saleh’s aids had 
distributed a fresh round of bribes to local tribal shaykhs to ensure their loyalty, but it 
was not enough.50 Eventually, the protesters clashed with troops loyal to Saleh, who 
opened fire killing 52 protesters.51 This prompted generals and soldiers to abandon the 
president and protect the demonstrators.  
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Three months prior to the upheaval, an AQAP leaders in Yemen had proposed to 
bin Laden the possibility of taking territory in order to establish an Islamic State in 
Yemen. At that time, Bin Laden had rejected the idea for lack of support in Yemen, but 
with the government and military in flux, there was now room to act. The group came up 
with a new brand—Ansar al-Shariah or the supporters of Islamic law—aimed not at just 
attacking the West, but providing serious governance and public support to the eastern 
provinces.52 A direct ground offensive to take Zanjubar, Abyan province’s capital, began 
in late May of 2011 with stunning success. Only a small group of soldiers held out in  
the city.53 In the absence of a unified Yemeni military, America intervened, dropping 
supplies to the isolated soldiers and the Saudis began air attacks on al Qaeda positions in 
the area.54 Not until September 10 did Yemeni forces (under enormous Saudi and U.S. 
pressure) move into the area to push back al Qaeda.55 Despite AQAP’s tactical loss, their 
attempts to govern in Abyan through Ansar al-Sharia show an increased capability to 
pursue political goals that pose real challenges to Yemen’s central government. While 
terrorist actions continue, they are now becoming part of a true insurgency movement 
aimed at goals that were unreachable before Arab spring turmoil. 
If al Qaeda could see that Saleh’s days were numbered, so too could the United 
States and Saudi Arabia. Together with the remaining states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), they attempted several times to get Saleh to leave in exchange for 
immunity, thereby allowing the country to resume normal activities.56 Saleh held on to 
power, even after he had to flee to KSA for medical treatment after a bomb assassination 
attempt injured him. Finally, in November, Saleh signed the agreement to step down, 
which began a 3-month transition period to his successor, Vice President Hadi.57 
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There has been a noticeable increase in UAV strikes in the years since Hadi took 
office. Hadi was more than willing to cooperate with American and Saudi efforts against 
AQAP, and in return he received the international backing he would need to stay in 
power against Saleh’s friends and relatives who were still in the government.58 Even 
today in exile, Saleh is still a powerful figure in Yemeni politics, if pulling only some of 
the strings.59 
E. U.S. FOREIGN AID AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO YEMEN 
The United States did not provide much in the way of aid to Yemen prior to 2009. 
Table 2 shows the progression of U.S. aid money from Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 through 
estimated 2014 totals. 
Table 1.   U.S. Combined Aid to Yemen60 
Fiscal Year  FY2007  FY2008  FY2009  FY2010  FY2011  FY2012  FY2013  FY2014* 
U.S. Combined 
Aid Dollars 
(Millions)  56  25.8  123.4  299  159.7  352.3  316.2  221.4 
 
A significant increase in FY2009 coincides with the resuming of UAV operations 
in the country. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains the increase 
in FY2010 as a response to the December25, 2009, airliner bombing attempt. The 
subsequent decline in FY2011 was due to political turmoil during the Arab Spring 
movement, and was primarily a decrease in foreign military assistance, though it resumed 
in FY2012 with the installation of a new President and his promise of renewed efforts 
against AQAP.61  
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It is worth noting that, with Yemen’s GDP being mostly reliant on dwindling oil 
reserves and foreign aid, any interruption—like the losses of 1990—would have 
devastating consequences to Yemen’s economy. Some have suggested that since much of 
the U.S. aid is contingent on counterterrorism, Yemen stands to benefit from 
exaggerating the threat posed by AQAP.62 
F. THE CASE OF ANWAR AL-AWLAKI 
One of the most publicized cases of UAV strikes was the September 30, 2011, 
strike that killed noted AQAP cleric and U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki. Only one U.S. 
citizen has reportedly been killed by UAVs in Pakistan, whereas three instances 
involving U.S. citizens occurred in Yemen.63 Even the first strike in 2002 inadvertently 
killed Kamal Darwish, a Yemeni native with U.S. citizenship, although he was not 
known to be with al-Harithi at the time.64 The United States had been tracking Awlaki for 
years, since from Yemen he had allegedly connected with U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan, 
influencing his actions in the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, Texas, where 13 people died.65 
Awlaki had been a cleric in the United States, and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was 
outspoken against violent Islam. By 2009, his rhetoric had changed drastically against 
America, and he had moved to Yemen and was working with al Qaeda.66 Awlaki had 
also been involved with Umar Farouk Abdu Mutallab in the December 25, 2009, plot to 
bring down an airliner over Detroit with a bomb from Yemen.67 This landed Awlaki on 
the Obama administration’s kill list. As with the 2002 strike, the Yemeni defense 
ministry said that Yemeni forces had hunted down Awlaki, leaving the exact details of 
his death up in the air, though most assumed UAVs seen by local tribes orbiting the area 
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where Awlaki died were involved.68 In addition, the strike killed Samir Khan, a Pakistani 
U.S. citizen, who was the editor of al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine. However, this was not a 
crippling blow to AQAP, which has continued gaining ground in Eastern Yemen, or to 
Inspire, which has put out several more editions since Khan’s death.  
The reason this specific case is relevant to the political issues surrounding UAV 
use in Yemen is that it reinforces the United States in its own perspective of its legal 
rights and rationale for using these weapons in a ‘“non-interstate war”‘ with al Qaeda. 
Immediately after the Ft. Hood shooting, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling on 
the president “to give sufficient weight to the situation in Yemen in efforts to prevent 
terrorist attacks on the United States, United States allies, and Yemeni civilians.”69 By 
December of 2009, the UAV strikes against AQAP had resumed.70 When a U.S. 
Department of Justice (DoJ) memo used as justification for targeting U.S. citizens was 
made public, it noted all of the previous rationale for national self-defense. In addition, 
the memo directly addressed the issue of constitutional due process and that a citizen’s 
interest in his or her life “must be balanced against the United States’ interest in 
forestalling the threat of violence and death to other Americans.”71 It also stipulated a 
requirement prior to taking lethal action is an assessment that it is infeasible to capture 
the target.72 Yemen’s instability and lack of control in rural areas where AQAP operates 
seemingly tie America to the tactics of UAV strikes, rather than hoping the unreliable 
Yemeni security apparatus can capture terrorists or risking U.S. lives in more complex 
operations to do so. 
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G. COLLATERAL DAMAGE EFFECTS 
Direct intervention in Yemen has fueled a strong anti-American sentiment among 
a significant portion of the population.73 This is not a new position for the United States, 
which has had troubles with public opinion in other countries. The endemic anti-
Americanism of Yemeni public opinion long ante-dates the use of drone for counter-
terrorism, which suggests that, with respect to mollifying public attitudes, it scarcely 
matters whether UAVs are more effective than other means at avoiding civilian 
casualties. But this does not mean that drone strikes do not serve as are recruiting tool for 
AQAP, which routinely employs them to dramatize what it wishes to portray as the 
indiscriminate and illegitimate use of American power. The estimated number of strikes, 
civilians killed and total people killed in Yemen through the end of 2014, based on open 
source reporting, is presented in Table 2.  
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Table 2.   Data from UAV Strikes in Yemen74 
Source/ Year Strikes Total Killed Civilians Killed 
The New America Foundation 
2002 1 6 0 
2003–2008 0 0 0 
2009 2 105 41 
2010 1 8 6 
2011 12 127 4 
2012 56 542 17 
2013 26 141 15 
2014 19 153 4 
Total 117 1082 87 
The Long War Journal 
2002 1 6 0 
2003–2008 0 0 0 
2009 2 55 14 
2010 4 16 6 
2011 10 81 0 
2012 41 225 35 
2013 26 116 17 
2014 23 144 6 
Total 107 643 78 
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
Total 109 639 96 
 
Data provided from the three sources average out to 112 strikes, with 82 of 862 of 
those killed being civilians. While the less than 10% collateral damage reported in these 
figures is indicative of how precise these weapons can be, that 10% figure has created 
significant political capital for AQAP, especially in rural areas.75  
Certain cases show that intelligence failures on the ground in Yemen can have 
damaging effects on American policy goals. For example, two weeks after the strike that 
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killed al-Awlaki, there was another strike targeting an Egyptian named Ibrahim al-Banna, 
who was allegedly planning a new attack.76 The missile instead struck a group of nine 
teenagers around a campfire, including Awlaki’s American-born son, Abd al-Rahman, 
killing him and his cousin.77 This coincidence was framed by AQAP to paint a vicious 
picture of U.S. tactics to Yemenis.  
Another collateral damage case illustrating the benefits AQAP reaps from these 
intelligence shortcomings occurred on August 29, 2012, in the village of Khashamir. 
UAVs that had been tracking three assumed AQAP members attacked late at night, firing 
4 missiles killing the three men and two other “fellows” who happened to be present.78 
Unfortunately, those two fellows were a local traffic policeman Walid Abdullah bin Ai 
Jaber, and his cousin Salim bin Ahmed Ali Jaber, the local Imam who preached against 
violent Islamism and AQAP.79 The strike was deep in AQAP-influenced territory in the 
eastern province of Hadhramaut, where the American and Yemeni governments have few 
points of influence.80 
Though the data indicates that these cases are not the norm, they are unfortunately 
not isolated incidents, and are spread among Yemenis more than are the bad deeds of 
AQAP. AQAP does not even need to push propaganda in villages like Khashamir, where 
people fear going out to markets or sending their children to school.81 At the same time 
as it presents a ruthless image of America, AQAP has gone around areas like Abyan 
province—places where it holds some sway—and begun conducting public works 
projects as a means of garnering more support from a region long underserved by central 
governments.82 In some cases, AQAP projects have provided water and electric lines to 
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houses and villages that had neither, and in a country whose water is expected to run out 
within a decade, this incentivizes populations to be sympathetic to if not supportive of 
AQAP.83 Al Qaeda is gaining political control over real sections of territory in Eastern 
Yemen, lessening the ability of the central Yemeni government to effectively work with 
its population to limit the spread of al Qaeda. The continuation of this trend will only 
increase U.S. reliance on UAVs and limit the intelligence available to prosecute AQAP in 
Yemen. 
H. SUMMARY 
The information presented in this chapter is largely a historical context for 
understanding current international politics concerning Yemen. There are several 
important points to take away from this brief recounting. Yemen is a complex system of 
political alliances between tribes, political parties, the military and elements of the 
government. The state is limited in its ability to govern by the conditions of these 
relationships and by its reliance on certain elements over others. This limited control of 
the political space in Yemen has provided conditions conducive to insurgency as is now 
being carried out by the Houthis in the north and AQAP supported Ansar al-Sharia in the 
east. Yemen is in this position due to a failing economy and reliance on foreign aid, 
which often comes with conditions that hinder the government’s ability to engage with 
certain groups.  
States wishing to interact on the global stage with Yemen must at the very least 
understand that these internal relationships exist and that the central government is 
limited in its power to conduct the business of a nation-state in the modern sense. U.S. 
and Saudi engagement against AQAP and the Houthis has further alienated elements of 
the population against government attempts to impose rule of law. The limited support of 
the population presents serious barriers to intelligence operations necessary to accurately 
engage terrorist groups in support of shoring up Yemeni control. UAVs are just an 
symptom of U.S. policy attempts to do something about the problems in Yemen while 
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minimizing the actual amount of resources used to do so. If the situation in Yemen does 
not improve soon, the United States may end up spending significantly more on a larger 
problem than if they had focused their efforts more economically and accurately at the 
beginning of these troubles. 
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IV. PAKISTAN 
A. THE UNITED STATES’ ON AND OFF RELATIONSHIP WITH 
PAKISTAN 
Pakistan’s position at the crossroads of central and south Asia, as well as its proximity to 
the Persian Gulf and Middle East make it a strategically important location with respect 
to U.S. interests on the far side of the world (see figure 2). South Asia in general is an 
area with few socio-cultural ties to the U.S. and sit in vastly differing political arenas. 
While Pakistan sees itself as a world player with significant contribution to the global 
structure, U.S. policies are generally directed toward short term objectives in the region. 
A review of the back and forth history of the relationship between these two states shows 
that both their foreign policies are accurately characterized as “largely based on self-
serving reasons rather than mutually congruent objectives.”84  
 
Figure 2.  Map of Pakistan and Region85 
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1. Initial U.S.-Pakistan Relations 
Pakistan’s birth and infancy came at a time when the United States viewed every 
foreign policy decision through the lens of the Cold War. India seemed to be the logical 
choice to counter Soviet and communist influence in South Asia, being four times the 
size of Pakistan in both territory and population, and India had more stable democratic 
government and ideals.86 The trouble with India was their reluctance to give up a policy 
of non-alignment in the struggle between the great powers, which produced generally 
cordial Indo-Soviet relations, particularly after Stalin’s death.87 This led the United States 
to foster a relationship with Pakistan, its next best option in South Asia. Pakistan had 
attempted to present itself as a viable anti-communist partner in order to draw U.S. aid 
money to support a growing military structure.  
From the beginning, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has displayed a significant 
disparity of outlook between the two sides. The United States provided aid and signed a 
bilateral agreement of cooperation with Pakistan as a measure of exercising political 
influence against the Soviets in South Asia. The Pakistanis saw this agreement and other 
military support policies as a solid backing of their territorial and political sovereignty in 
the region, and not just against communism.88 When Pakistan engaged in a second war in 
Kashmir against India in 1965, they assumed that America would continue this support. 
Instead, the United States adopted a neutral stance and suspended aid to both sides, a 
move seen as abandonment in Pakistan.89 Drawing from this experience, Pakistan learned 
that their best political option was not to choose just one ally in international politics, but 
to follow India’s lead and have a multilateral stance open to the three major players (U.S., 
China, and Russia).90 This episode in international relations should have indicated to the 
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United States that Pakistan did not see these issues as primarily related to the Cold War, 
but rather to their security posture against India—a concern that continues to define 
Pakistan’s political moves. 
2. Jihad as a Pakistani Political Tool 
The wars in Kashmir show the repeated implementation of an asset that indicates 
a pattern of Pakistani behavior in regional politics: the use of Jihadi militias for state 
political purposes. Shortly after attaining statehood, Pakistan sought to firm up their 
claims as a South Asian state for Muslims by acquiring the majority Muslim territory of 
Kashmir in 1947, whose accession to either Pakistan or India had not been decided at the 
time of British withdrawal. Intelligence assessments in Pakistan at the time concluded 
that the possibility of an uprising of the Muslim population against the ruling Hindu 
Maharaja was possible, even likely.91 In the first Kashmir War, the Pakistani army 
provided arms and other services to militias—many of which were inspired by the notion 
of liberating Kashmir in a jihad—enabling them to quickly push toward the Kashmiri 
capital, Srinagar, prompting an Indian military response.92 Later, after Pakistan’s regular 
army had finally committed its forces, the war ended with Kashmir split between both 
sides, affirming for Pakistan the use of religiously motivated militants to limit direct 
engagement with the larger, more capable Indian military as an effective policy. 
In the second Kashmir war (1965), Pakistan’s plans for Islamic militias were 
more robust than the opportunistic plans of 1947. These militias received training and 
arms from the Pakistani side of Kashmir, and infiltrated across the border in small groups 
to attack Indian Kashmir. There had been unrest in the inter-war period, leading Pakistan 
to believe that Kashmiris would join in with the militants to overthrow Indian rule.93 As 
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in 1947, Pakistan’s regular forces did not enter the conflict until after the irregular forces 
had struck. The eventual stalemate ended with a Soviet brokered return to status quo ante 
bellum, but further proved to Pakistan that militias, especially religiously motivated ones, 
could be used to prosecute their ambitions abroad without inflicting significant costs for 
their own military against the superior forces of India.94 It was a trend the United States 
would be able to use to its advantage in Pakistan’s troubled neighbor, Afghanistan. 
3. The United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in the 1980s 
If Pakistan makes most of its security decisions based primarily on India, its 
second consideration is Afghanistan. The disputed border between the two countries, 
known as the Durand Line, is a holdover from colonial India. In 1893, Sir Henry 
Mortimer Durand entered into an agreement with Afghan leader Abdur Rahman Khan to 
establish the boundary between the British colony and the independent state. In the 
process, Durand set an international border straddling the areas of the Pashtun and Baloch 
tribes, leading successive Afghan governments to question the legitimacy of the line. 
Afghanistan was the only country which did not vote in favor of Pakistani admission to 
the UN in 1947, because of the unsettled border. The countries would continue having 
border issues until a foreign invader provided the opportunity for Pakistani influence to 
extend into Afghanistan. 
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan was still on the 
U.S. side of the Great Powers game, even though the relationship had diminished in the 
previous decade due in part to Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear program.95 The myopic 
U.S. political strategies of the Cold War presented an opportunity for Pakistan to once 
again fall into American good graces in the support of the Afghan mujahedeen’s fight 
against the U.S.S.R. With the loss of Iran as an ally in the region due to revolution, 
Pakistan’s leader Zia ul-Haq managed to get military aid from the United States that 
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topped $250 million by 1985.96 This aid was funneled through Pakistan’s Inter Services 
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to groups that it supported in Afghanistan. The ISI and Zia 
preferred to aid groups with Islamist ideals instead of ethnic related groups, such as 
Pashtun nationalists.97 Pakistan’s strategy was intended not just to deal with the threat 
posed by a Soviet force on its doorstep, but to provide Zia with influence in the post war 
politics of Afghanistan in order to have an ally—not based on nationalism but on shared 
religious ideals—supporting their security posture against India.98 
4. Rise of the Taliban and Nuclear Troubles 
As quickly as U.S. policies had shifted toward engagement in Afghanistan, the 
subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 saw an equally dramatic policy shift in 
the other direction. With no need to continue funneling weapons to Afghanistan, U.S. 
military aid to Pakistan quickly declined. Global politics required the United States to 
levy sanctions against the Pakistani nuclear program toward which America had turned a 
blind eye when it needed Pakistan’s assistance.99 The decline of U.S. involvement in the 
region created conditions in Afghanistan that the ISI quickly exploited by supporting the 
same religious organizations they had during the war, and interacting with local 
chieftains.100 One of Pakistan’s attempts to tie Afghanistan to Pakistan was by restoring 
and protecting the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar-Quetta highway.101 The ISI found it difficult 
to get the different tribes to work together, and looked for a single group to stabilize 
Afghanistan. They found it in the Taliban.  
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Though Pakistan has officially denied supporting the Taliban, the group’s rapid 
success in gaining control of Afghanistan made them the most useful group for the ISI to 
use to further their policy goals in the region. 102 As one Pakistani diplomat said: “We 
will support whoever can bring stability to Afghanistan. If they are angels, nothing like it. 
And if they are devils, we don’t mind.”103 The arrangement worked for Pakistan, since 
the Taliban was the only apparent group that could stabilize Pakistan’s western border. 
When the Taliban gained control of Kabul, Pakistan was the first of only three countries 
to recognize the government—the other two being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). These Pakistani policies concerning Afghanistan were again designed to 
build regional strength against their arch-rival India.  
The threat that Pakistan continued to perceive from India received some 
justification in early May, 1998, when India conducted a series of five nuclear tests, 
shifting the balance of military power in South Asia it its favor.104 Both India and 
Pakistan was being pushed by western countries to abandon these programs, arguably 
having the most significant effect on U.S. policy toward Pakistan prior to 9/11.105 
Pakistan felt it had no choice but to respond in kind, conducting their own tests by the 
end of the same month, arguably restoring a power balance to South Asia and further 
straining American relationships with both countries.106  
B. POST 9/11 PAK-U.S. RELATIONSHIP: BUSINESS AS USUAL 
Pakistan, like many other countries realized quickly that America would respond 
swiftly against those who perpetrated and supported the attacks of 9/11. The call to 
Pakistan came the day after the attacks, first between U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
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Powell and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Later on that second day there was a 
meeting between Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and the director of the ISI, 
Lt-Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who was in Washington, DC, at the time of the attacks. Both 
conversations indicated the direction of coming U.S. policy was targeted at the Taliban 
and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As in Yemen, Pakistan had a choice that they were with the 
United States or against it, and were presented with a list of seven requirements that 
included basing and overflight rights, intelligence sharing, and cessation of support for 
the Taliban.107  
Musharraf noted in his memoir that even if he wanted to resist the U.S. 
ultimatum, Pakistan could not survive the consequences of such defiance. It was 
militarily weak compared to the United States, could not sustain its economy in the face 
of U.S. consequences, and socially “lack[ed] the homogeneity to galvanize the entire 
nation into an active confrontation [with the United States]”108 Interestingly, Musharraf’s 
analysis keeps with the traditional Pakistani paradigm by framing the decision to support 
American policy as a strategic issue against India, which had already offered its bases to 
America. Musharraf saw increased Indo-U.S. relations as a threat to Pakistan’s stake in 
Kashmir as well as their nuclear weapons. Although losing the stability they had gained 
on their Afghan border by supporting the Taliban, when weighed against the possible 
benefits from U.S. support they would receive in a war on terror, Musharraf concluded 
that the Taliban was not worth committing suicide over.109 
Once again, the United States found itself in need of Pakistani help. Pakistan too 
found itself in a familiar position with much to lose if it did not cooperate and a fair 
amount to gain if it did. It agreed to many of the U.S. requirements and modified others 
(such as limiting basing to two airfields and restricting overflight to a narrow “highway” 
to Afghanistan) in order to limit domestic condemnation of the U.S. presence.110 Both the 
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United States and Pakistan’s political decisions continued the trend established since the 
beginning of the relationship. 
1. The Significance of the FATA 
With Pakistan’s ostensible support, the stage was set for Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Once U.S. troops were on the ground, it opened the door 
to UAVs used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the 
difficult to navigate mountains where al Qaeda was hiding. Almost immediately, the 
United States began armed UAV strikes in support of combat operations.  
Seeing the rapid influx of U.S. forces into Afghanistan, many Taliban and al 
Qaeda members fled across the Pakistani border into the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA). In this semi-autonomous region of Pakistan, al Qaeda and the Taliban 
were able to train and conduct attacks against U.S. forces across the border with little to 
stop them.111 The United States asked Pakistan to deal with the militants in FATA, but as 
a backup plan, began flying Predators over the tribal areas from the airbase leased by the 
United States in Jocobabad, Baluchistan.112 In 2002 and 2003, the UAVs did exclusively 
ISR missions over the FATA, focusing on North and South Waziristan in particular (see 
Figure 3).  
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Figure 3.  Map of FATA and Pakistan-Afghanistan Border113 
Pakistani attempts at military operations in South Waziristan to root out Taliban 
and al Qaeda met with mixed results, killing some militants but straining relationships 
with the local tribes. After the precedent set in Yemen in 2002, the United States finally 
decided to use armed UAVs inside Pakistan against an outspoken Taliban commander 
named Nek Muhammad. The strike occurred in South Waziristan, where Muhammad 
died in an explosion on June 18, 2004, that was claimed by Pakistani forces as a 
successful operation against the Taliban. Witnesses reported seeing a strange metal bird 
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flying around and that Muhamad was on his cell phone at the time of the attack, likely the 
tracking mechanism used by the CIA.114 After 2004, UAV strikes in Pakistan would 
increase exponentially, especially after President Obama took office. UAVs, as former 
Obama CIA director Leon Panetta put it, are “the only game in town in terms of trying to 
disrupt the al-Qaida leadership.”115 
2. The Strikes Increase in FATA 
As the years spent prosecuting the Long War in South Asia progressed, UAV 
strikes became more commonplace, but were still directed at taking out high-level al 
Qaeda operatives. As indicated in Table 3, only 10 strikes were reported in Pakistan 
before 2008. The strikes in 2008 more than tripled the previous years’ numbers. This was 
likely due to the increased autonomy given to the CIA for “Signature Strikes,” in which 
males of military age might be targeted based on suspicious patterns of activity, such as 
possession of weapons or placing improvised explosive devices (IEDs).116 This increased 
not only the number of strikes, but also the number of “militants” killed in the strikes, 
since according to the CIA and government metrics, any military-aged male would be 
counted as a militant unless explicit evidence posthumously proved innocence.117 
Though this was not officially confirmed by either the Bush or Obama administrations, 
one government official joked that “when the C.I.A. sees ‘three guys doing jumping 
jacks,’ the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp.”118 These practices likely still 
continue, though on a tighter leash due to repercussions from some high-profile cases that 
raised questions about accountability in the secret UAV programs.  
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3. Collateral Damage and Domestic Reprisals 
Signature strikes are likely to blame for many of the civilian casualties in Pakistan 
from UAV strikes. The three sources compiled in Table 3 provide estimates based on 
open source reporting from Pakistan, with data through the end of 2014. Data from the 
three sources averages out to 394 strikes, and 2766 people killed of which 251 were 
civilians. That is a nine percent collateral damage rate, though the U.S. government 
disputes the civilian numbers as lower, and the Pakistanis estimate the casualties as 
higher.119 Though the number of strikes declines after 2011 due to increased 
requirements placed on signature strikes, there is still substantial activity in a region 
where there is not a declared war. 
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Table 3.   Data from UAV Strikes in Pakistan120 
Year Strikes Total Killed Civilians Killed 
The New America Foundation 
2004-2007 10 178 101 
2008 36 282 25 
2009 54 536 25 
2010 122 818 14 
2011 72 483 6 
2012 48 361 5 
2013 27 165 5 
2014 22 155 0 
Total 391 2978 181 
The Long War Journal 
2004 1 
2005 2 1 0 
2006 3 142 20 
2007 5 73 0 
2008 35 317 31 
2009 53 506 43 
2010 117 815 14 
2011 64 435 30 
2012 46 304 4 
2013 28 137 14 
2014 24 152 0 
Total 378 2882 156 
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
Total 413 2438 416 
 
Of these cases, a few stand out for their scale and for the domestic Pakistani 
reaction that followed them. The most illustrative of these is the case of a signature strike 
in North Waziristan on March 17, 2011. In the village of Datta Khel, a meeting of tribal 
elders, known as a Jirga, was convened. About 40 men sat around rugs laid out in the 
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open to engage in the traditional political mechanism of the tribal regions to discuss 
issues of chromite mining in the region.121 The Pakistani military knew about the 
meeting, which was to take place in a public space near a bus depot. Twenty minutes into 
the meeting, four missiles impacted the site, killing 45 people.122 Sources within the U.S. 
government indicated that this was a meeting of senior militants, making the attack 
justifiable.123 However, the repercussions in Pakistan were significant, drawing 
condemnation from Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Kayani, and inciting protests outside 
the U.S. consulates in the cities of Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar.124  
This particular incident also reportedly caused problems within the Obama 
administration. The ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter (with secretary of state 
Hillary Clinton’s support) argued for veto power over strikes, which were damaging the 
U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The CIA—then led by director Leon Panetta—argued against 
this policy and was allowed to continue the program with minimal interference from the 
ambassador.125 It was a moment reminiscent of another CIA misadventure, when the 
agency ignored advice from state department personnel in Tehran, and implemented a 
coup against Iranian Prime Minister, Muhammad Mussadiq, reinstating the Shah, and 
paving the way for Iranian ill-will toward the United States 126 
4. Goodwill Killings? 
In addition to the problems presented by signature strikes, some of the targeted 
strikes began to raise more questions about secret policies governing U.S. UAV 
operations. Around the time that President Obama took office, Musharraf stepped down 
                                                 
121. Robert Greenwald, “Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars,” October 30, 2013, 
https://vimeo.com/86611130.  
122. New America Foundation, “Drone Wars: Pakistan.”  
123. Mazzetti, Way of the Knife, 291. 
124. Ibid. 
125. Ibid., 292. 
126. Mark Gasiorowski, “US Foreign Policy Toward Iran During the Mussadiq Era,” in The Middle 
East and the United States 5th ed., edited by David W. Lesch and Mark L. Haas (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2012), 64–65. 
 42
from the office of President of Pakistan, allowing an elected civilian government to take 
over. While this signaled a significant leap in Pakistani politics, many of the domestic 
terrorism problems remained, particularly the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also 
known as the Pakistani Taliban). The TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud, operated from the 
shelter of the FATA. The TTP primarily carried out attacks against Pakistani institutions 
and civilians, initially leading to the determination that Mehsud could not be a target of a 
UAV strike since he was not “an imminent threat to the United States.”127  
This opinion evolved over time, since the TTP had sheltered elements of al Qaeda 
and TTP attacks in Pakistan could endanger U.S. citizens in the country.128 This 
imminent threat to Pakistani security seemed to provide a bridge of goodwill between the 
countries that would allow UAV strikes to continue. A UAV found Mehsud in August 
2009 on the roof of his in-law’s home in South Waziristan, with his wife and other 
members of his family.129 The missile struck the roof, killing Mehsud and three family 
members, a result satisfactory to both Pakistan and the United States. 130 Thus the strikes 
continued beyond 2009, with Pakistan’s approval. 
5. Neptune’s Spear 
UAV operations in Pakistan are not happening in a vacuum of other U.S. activity, 
as indicated by the state department concerns over UAVs, and combat operations in 
neighboring Afghanistan. The repercussions of UAV strikes in Pakistan can be compared 
to the effects from the 2011 raid that killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, which also 
occurred in Pakistan’s territory. Pakistan’s tacit support for UAVs allowed for the ISR 
missions which helped locate and confirm the location of bin Laden in a compound in 
Abbottabad, a town about 30 miles north of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. 
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The use of UAVs was certainly bothersome to many in Pakistan, but it allowed 
for some insulating distance between U.S. forces and Pakistan itself. Manned U.S. 
aircraft conducting attacks in Pakistan would have never been allowed, nor would any 
U.S. troop presence in the country. When a CIA contractor, Raymond Davis, killed two 
armed Pakistanis in early 2011, the incident severely strained diplomatic relations and 
drew public condemnation of the United States. 131 A special forces raid would likely 
have similar effects. These differences between manned and unmanned operations were 
illustrated by the aftereffects of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. 
On May 1, 2011, Navy SEALs flew from Afghanistan to raid bin Laden’s 
compound, while the eyes of a stealthy CIA Sentinel UAV beamed images of the 
operation back to the Whitehouse. The SEALs killed bin Laden among others defending 
the compound, gathered as much intelligence as they could, and were back in 
Afghanistan with bin Laden’s body less than four hours after they had taken off. Pakistan 
was not informed of the raid until after it had happened, when President Obama called 
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, and Admiral Mullen (then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff) contacted General Kayani.132 Though both Pakistanis congratulated their 
U.S. counterparts on the mission, Kayani in particular expressed concern over the 
violation of Pakistani sovereignty and the backlash that would come in the absence of a 
statement about the mysterious raid.133 The announcement that night by President Obama 
may have explained the extraordinary reason for the intrusion into Pakistan, but it did not 
explain why not a single Pakistani had been notified in advance. That explanation came 
two days later from Leon Panetta, who expressed doubts about whether the Pakistanis 
would have kept the secret.134 Pakistan now realized that, with bin Laden dead in its back 
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yard at the hands of U.S. operatives, strategic cooperation in the Long War had been one-
sided, and that neither side could completely trust the other.135 The U.S.-Pakistani 
relations rollercoaster was again headed downward; much work would be required to 
rebuild trust between the two countries. Despite the raid and downturn in relations, UAV 
strikes continue in Pakistan, either confirming American disregard for Pakistani 
sovereignty or affirming Pakistan’s reliance on U.S. support in any measure (even if 
condemning it publicly). 
6. U.S. Aid to Pakistan 
As with Yemen, one useful metric for evaluating the state of U.S. relations with 
Pakistan is aid money provided to the country. Over the course of the war in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan received a significant sum of aid money from the United States, as well as 
reimbursements for support provided to coalition forces for the war. The figures 
presented in Table 4 show that there was a steady rise in aid until after FY2011, when the 
numbers began to decrease. 




(AVG) FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014* FY2015*
Security 
Aid 315.4 989 1236 1277 849 361 353 336 
Economic 
Aid 462.1 1366 1769 1186 1067 834 610 546 
Coalition 
Support 956.7 685 1499 118 688 1438 144   
 
While it is unclear how much effect U.S. domestic budget concerns had on this 
trend, it is possible that the decline is due to U.S. preparation to reduce its involvement in 
the region as it has in the past. The United States also conducted the Osama bin Laden 
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raid and lost tacit public approval for UAV strikes from the government during the same 
timeframe.137 If the downward trend continues, Pakistan will likely turn to other 
countries like China for support, pursuing its ever-present goal of security against India. 
C. SUMMARY 
Pakistan occupies a position of great strategic importance in Asia. It knows it. It 
understands that it can be valuable to other states as a strategic ally, and it can compete 
with other regional powers through nuclear, conventional, and unconventional means. 
This makes Pakistan very capable, and potentially dangerous. At the same time, it is 
predictable—India and Afghanistan are Pakistan’s biggest concerns and, at the end of the 
day, all Pakistan wants is security. A secure, stable Pakistan is in the U.S. strategic 
interest, given the number of times American strategy has relied on Pakistan’s support. 
Yet, in the current paradigm, the United States again seems to be diminishing ties with 
Islamabad, now that the war in Afghanistan is over. There are residuals from this conflict 
that still occupy the FATA, concerning both the Pakistanis and the U.S. UAV operations 
in this region will likely continue as the least objectionable means to prosecute this Long 
War. As in Yemen, the autonomous region of the FATA, further from the control of the 
government, is where the terrorist threat is breeding and where it is being engaged by 
UAVs. This mutual security concern is the best means for future U.S.-Pakistan 
cooperation, so long as it is conducted in the frame of a long-term partnership and not in 
the short-term framework of previous iterations of this relationship. 
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V. CASE COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 
A. COMPARING THE CASES: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the reason for studying and comparing 
the countries of Yemen and Pakistan is that they are the centers of U.S. UAV operations. 
That is not the only similarity between these two countries, and while their differences 
seem to have little effect on U.S. policies, the differences do seem to contribute to the 
capacity for stability within each country. 
1. Governance 
Looking at the governments of Pakistan and Yemen at the height of UAV 
operations, we find two similar but distinct government systems. Yemen had an 
authoritarian system for over 30 years run by a single strong man (Saleh). Though he was 
well versed in dealing with the tribes and differing factions in the country, revolutions in 
ideas (the Arab Spring) coupled with revolutions in technology (social media and 
internet) allowed AQAP to grow in areas where his government—and subsequent 
governments of Yemen—have little control. Pakistan too had a government that was 
considered authoritarian, but it was centered on the cult of institution of the Army led by 
Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan’s military is still an important part of the politics of Pakistan, 
however as the country developed a more vigorous public life, animated in part by 
democratically-oriented reform, condemnation for UAVs and U.S. involvement 
increased. Pakistan, like Yemen, purports to rule over territory it does not fully control. 
The same new information technologies that have facilitated public 
communication by insurgents and terrorists have imposed new standards are public 
accountability even on authoritarian regimes. As a consequence, both Pakistan and 
Yemen have found it increasingly difficult to justify their toleration of external powers 
exercising force on their own populations. Both the Pakistani and Yemeni parliaments 
passed resolutions in 2012 and 2013, respectively, demanding the cessation of UAV 
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operations within their borders.138 These resolutions were non-binding and had no effect 
on Pakistani and Yemeni cooperation. Whether the opposition of authentically 
democratic governmental bodies could be brushed aside so easily in another matter, 
however. The ability to use UAVs in countries with which the United States is not at war 
seems to rely on an authoritarian government that complies with U.S. directives, or the 
absence of any effective government at all (as in Somalia). 
2. Regional Issues 
In regional politics, Pakistan sees itself as a major player trying to balance itself 
against India, and dealt with its internal security issues by granting a fair amount of 
autonomy to the FATA and empowering the ISI to channel extremist groups against its 
neighbors as a way of supporting its external security posture. Pakistan only became 
focused against the Taliban and al Qaeda after that became a requirement of the United 
States, and only because it stood to benefit from cooperation with America. These groups 
do not seem to constitute a big regional issue for Pakistan.  
Compared with Pakistan, Yemen is too small to realistically challenge for 
increased political clout in its region (the Arabian Peninsula), and tends to be more 
concerned with matters of internal security, which take a significant part of its military 
capacity. The regional issues pushed by Saudi Arabia are only one factor driving Yemeni 
policies, and Yemen’s fight against AQAP is a product of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 
This requirement drew Yemeni security forces away from the north where the Houthis 
continued to grow, further complicating Saudi regional concerns and eventually 
precipitating the current conflict in Yemen. Interestingly, the two largest actors within 
Yemen now seem to be the Houthis and AQAP—both vehemently opposed to each other. 
AQAP is now one of the few groups in Yemen with the capacity to take on the Houthis, 
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leading some pro-government fighters to also support AQAP, further upsetting Yemen’s 
internal politics.139  
Pakistan’s drive for regional influence and parity with India has fostered the 
development of a strong security apparatus that has, thus far, been able to maintain order 
in most of the country. Yemen’s relatively weak regional position makes it more 
susceptible to the requirements of stronger neighbors and international powers, requiring 
it to focus on outside policies before taking care of itself. 
3. Aid and Economies 
Pakistan and Yemen have both benefited from U.S. aid contributions. Both 
countries were also able to purchase some U.S. military hardware as a result of their 
cooperation. Aid money received from the United States does not drive Pakistan’s 
economy—which is diversified and has a GDP of $232.29 billion—but does still affect 
its political decisions.140 If Pakistan stopped receiving aid from America, history shows 
that Pakistan would find another “friend” (China most obviously) to help support its 
ability to maintain its current security posture against India. In Yemen, any amount of aid 
money is significant to the country’s economy, which only has a GDP of $35.95 billion 
and suffered from an unemployment rate of near 30% in 2013 (which has likely increased 
since then due to civil war). 141 These factors greatly contributing to Yemen’s willingness 
to seek this aid from any source. Yemen’s economy is failing, due to oil, qat, and water. 
Yemen’s oil reserves are the country’s primary source of funds, and their production has 
slowed since 2001, due to dwindling reserves and attacks on oil infrastructure.142 The qat 
and water problems are intertwined, and contribute to increasing hunger in Yemen. Qat is 
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an evergreen plant that contains a stimulant similar to amphetamine, which is chewed by 
at least half the Yemeni population. Cultivation of qat takes up 40% of Yemen’s irrigated 
farming land.143 Yemen used to be the most agriculturally successful Arab country; now 
its economy is driven by internal qat demand, which leads to increased reliance on food 
imports, causing further strain on the economy. Pakistan is a more stable country than 
Yemen in part because of its economy, which contributes to Pakistan’s ability to maintain 
and exercise its security apparatus. This is the biggest difference between these two 
cases. Yemen will find it difficult to grow its security without some stabilization of its 
economy. 
4. Tribal Areas 
UAVs are not being used to target people in Islamabad or Sana’a. They operate in 
the remote tribal areas of both Pakistan and Yemen—harsh, mountainous areas where the 
central government has limited control. These areas seem more stable under conditions of 
autonomy due to tribal culture and the population’s identity structure. As one Pakistani 
tribal leader said while talking about his identity in the early 1970s, “I have been a 
Pashtun for 6,000 years; a Muslim for 1,300 years; and a Pakistani for 25.”144 In these 
tribal areas, history, custom and honor are not just words but have entrenched meaning. A 
faceless UAV that kills one civilian for every nine militants is unsatisfactory to tribal 
honor. Maintaining positive relationships after a strike often requires the payment of 
“blood money” or provision of weapons to these tribal communities.145 These tribes are 
important to implementing stability in these countries, especially in areas where al Qaeda 
is winning popular support. This is not to say that future UAV use will be confined to 
tribal areas, but that the picture from 5000 feet does not provide sufficient information to 
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evaluate repercussions of strikes on these regions, and U.S. understanding of the culture 
where it carries out assaults is paramount to knowing when and when not to use UAVs.  
B. EVALUATING U.S. POLICIES 
With a better understanding of the cases, U.S. policies can now be evaluated for 
intent, cost, effectiveness, and improvement in Yemen and Pakistan. 
1. Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency  
The fight against al Qaeda is often viewed in America under the banner of 
Counterterrorism (CT). In this respect, U.S. policy accepts that the acts committed by al 
Qaeda are terrorist based on the idea that the acts are a means to demonstrate power 
through violence against a population. In the case of 9/11, the demonstration of force was 
directed at removing U.S. influence from the Middle East and South Asia. This 
contributes to their larger goal of expanding political influence in that region with 
eventual designs for true political control (as the Taliban had).146 This is where CT and 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) ideas merge. Terrorism is a tool often used by insurgencies, 
who must convince a population that they deserve control of or will take control of the 
political sphere. In Yemen and Pakistan, al Qaeda is an insurgency which is attempting to 
gain support of local populations in order to continue their greater struggle. Their efforts 
thus far have gained them a not insignificant amount of political capital, which they use 
to influence sections of the population in their favor. 
Counterterrorism then is defending the population from terrorist acts, which falls 
more closely in line with law enforcement tasks of providing for a population’s internal 
security. In the U.S. after 9/11, counterterrorism is evident in the levels of increased 
security at ports, airports, border crossings, as well as other increased security measures. 
In the countries of Yemen and Pakistan, the ability of the state to provide security against 
terrorist acts, especially in or originating from more autonomous regions is limited. 
Because there are groups in these countries who have committed or incited terror attacks 
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in America—such as 9/11, the Fort Hood shooting and Boston Marathon bombings—
U.S. engagement against these groups to prevent future attacks is viewed by America as 
CT for the U.S. population.  
In Yemen and Pakistan, al Qaeda and associated groups are conducting terror 
attacks against the local populations necessitating local CT and increased security. But 
these groups are not terrorizing the populations for no reason, as indicated in the Al 
Qaeda magazine, Inspire: 
Al-Qaeda's main goal in this stage—at least—is to aid every oppressed 
Muslim in this world regardless of his madhhab and race. As for its long-
term goal, is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through Jihad in the cause 
of Allah and to implement the Shari'a of Allah in the whole land of 
Allah.147  
Counterterrorism alone is insufficient to defeat or even control al Qaeda. A robust COIN 
capability that comes from within the contested country is necessary to eliminate the 
underlying conditions that allow for insurgencies and terrorism to flourish.  
This is the reason the United States has courted Yemeni and Pakistani military 
help and provided security aid to both countries: so that they can conduct the operations 
required to eliminate al Qaeda. But when these efforts are compared to other U.S. tactics, 
it becomes clear which path America prefers to take. UAVs are cheap, low risk, and as 
Admiral Dennis Blair said in 2011, “a global game of Whac-A-Mole—something to keep 
you busy,”148 and show the American public some progress in the Long War. The U.S. 
goal is to defeat al Qaeda. For Yemen and Pakistan, defeating al Qaeda is a proximate 
goal—it is a way of helping establishing control over a population and political space, 
which is the ultimate goal. U.S. UAV strikes risk alienating the very people whose 
cooperation is needed to stabilize and control these countries.  
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2. Degrading Al Qaeda 
The objective of UAV strikes is supposed to be targeting high-level al Qaeda 
members for the purpose of disrupting operations, which eventually will contribute to the 
organization’s defeat.149 The development of the signature strike doctrine indicated that 
U.S. strategy had shifted to a war of attrition as a way of degrading al Qaeda. The CIA 
still looks at the strikes in terms of numbers, as indicated by Director John Brennan: 
“Might some of these actions be stimulants to others joining their ranks? Sure, that’s a 
possibility. I think, though it has taken off of the battlefield a lot more terrorists, than it 
has put on.”150 Yet despite the reported numbers of militants killed, al Qaeda seems to be 
as strong as ever, especially in Yemen where it is a major player in the current conflict. 
U.S. strategy has focused too much on al Qaeda’s chain of command and too little on al 
Qaeda’s base of support. “The mere killing of insurgents, without the simultaneous 
destruction of their infrastructure, is a waste of effort because all casualties will be made 
good by new recruits.”151 In short, U.S. UAV policies in Yemen and Pakistan may have 
helped prevent large-scale attacks on the United States, but have also sown the seeds of 
discontent in these remote regions such that a self-perpetuating cycle of strike and 
regeneration will continue in the absence of a policy shift.  
It is relatively difficult to estimate numbers of al Qaeda and other affiliated 
groups, but the expansion of Taliban and AQAP influence is undeniable in Pakistan and 
Yemen. Two other metrics can help illuminate the effectiveness of these groups and 
whether they are gaining or losing capacity: propaganda output and rate of attacks. One 
analysis of al Qaeda central (Pakistan) output of propaganda found that: 
plots of the time series for [UAV] strikes and Al Qaeda media output 
show no clear relationships. Regression analysis finds that [UAV] strikes 
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may be associated with more, not less, propaganda output. The 
relationship is not sufficiently clear-cut that we are willing to conclude 
that there has been a positive relationship between drone strikes and 
propaganda. However, in none of the regression models was the 
relationship clearly or strongly negative. This suggests that, at best, 
[UAV] strikes have little or no effect on Al Qaeda’s ability to create and 
issue propaganda. Al Qaeda’s propaganda output appears to be quite 
resilient in the face of [UAV] strikes.152 
As for the metric of attacks, it seems that both Yemen and Pakistan have suffered 
violent acts due to their cooperation with the United States. In Pakistan, the Taliban killed 
over 140 Pakistanis (mostly children) in a school in December 2014, among others.153 In 
Yemen, AQAP carried out multiple attacks on government and army buildings during the 
ramp up of UAV strikes from 2009 to 2011.154 These cases are not meant to indicate a 
trend one way or the other, only to show that attacks do continue in both countries.  
Compare the U.S. campaign in Yemen and Pakistan with the Israeli targeted 
assassination campaign during the al-Aqsa uprising from 2000 to 2004. Though the 
Israelis used conventional (not unmanned) weapons to conduct this campaign, 
elimination of high-value leadership targets is the same basic principle of the U.S. UAV 
campaign against al Qaeda.155 In a multivariate analysis of the Israeli case, Mohammed 
Hafez and Joseph Hatfield found that despite hypothetical expectations of deterrence, 
backlash (increased attacks), disruption, and diminishing capacity, the analysis did not 
support any of these outcomes.156 Their conclusion suggests that a decreased Palestinian 
violence rate resulted from increased Israeli security measures, creating a “diminishing 
opportunity effect, whereby terrorists find it difficult to penetrate targets that were 
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previously vulnerable to attack because of purely defensive measures.”157 There certainly 
is a diminishing opportunity effect for attacks in the United States. This effect is less in 
Pakistan but still present due to their military institutions, and seemingly non-existent in 
Yemen, which, as of this writing (spring 2015) has fallen into civil war. 
C. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT UAVS 
Why do UAVs invoke such strong emotions about the nature and conduct of war? 
As sticks and rocks gave way to spears, bows, and arrows, so too did smooth bore muzzle 
loaders give way to repeating rifled guns. Every evolution in weaponry seems to add 
distance between shooter and target, and at every step there were cries of dishonor and 
unfairness. Yet in all of these steps, combatants were always in the same geographic 
region and usually in range of one another. When America found itself in a war, soldiers 
and sailors had to be deployed to the area of conflict to carry out American policy.  
In the case of UAVs, a country can now exercise power without immediate, 
reciprocal risk to the forces involved. The very same miniaturization of technology that 
allows U.S. airmen to operate a complex ISR aircraft from thousands of miles away, is 
the same technology that allows a terrorist to put out more complex and professional 
propaganda using his iPhone and social media sites to spread their message and increase 
recruiting capability.158 In Yemen and Pakistan, technology is working for both sides, 
and the result is not rapid, clean warfare, but instability and a lengthy struggle. 
UAV technology is not a coming thing of the future, as the United States, Britain, 
Israel, China, and Iran all have operational armed UAVs.159 Other countries like Russia, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have all begun pursuing armed 
UAVs.160 Recently, Pakistan demonstrated an indigenously produced armed UAV for 
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use in the FATA against Taliban and other insurgents.161 In the traditional arms race 
between the two countries, India is also seeking to arm drones, in what may lead to future 
unmanned wars for Kashmir.162 With technology evolving at ever faster rates, the world 
community must come up with new rules regarding UAVs or the only precedent for 
customary law will be the actions of the United States against al Qaeda. 
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Based on the available unclassified information, recent events have shown that 
UAVs are an amazingly capable tactical tool. The United States has used them primarily 
to gather intelligence against adversarial groups and to successfully eliminate several 
high-level al Qaeda members, which does on some level degrade their capability to 
operate against America. UAVs are used only in countries with authoritarian 
governments (or lack of an effective government as in Somalia) that are capable of 
unilaterally allowing U.S. assets to operate within their borders.  
U.S. strategy seems to be primarily reliant on these amazing tools to root out 
threats to America. In this way, it has failed to address the true problems on the ground, 
which allows these groups to survive and, in some cases, flourish. UAVs are used against 
groups in areas where government control is weak. In the case of Yemen and Pakistan, 
these are tribal areas where the U.S. can do little to appease the local leaders if it is not 
interacting with them directly or supporting the central government in ways to improve 
relations with these outlying areas. In many cases, the demands of U.S. policy have 
placed these governments at odds with elements of their populations, promoting anti-
Americanism. In the case of Yemen, pushing its forces to focus on AQAP stretched its 
capabilities thin, helping pave the way for the Houthis to take control of a significant 
portion of the country. Pakistan’s greater military capacity is a likely reason why it has 
been able to maintain more stability than Yemen despite repercussions of U.S. 
involvement in FATA. Relationships with both Pakistan and Yemen have been damaged 
by the continuation of UAV strikes. 
In Yemen and Pakistan, U.S. policies have not been strategically effective against 
al Qaeda, but they have minimized the danger to U.S. service members at a low cost to 
America. Other countries will see this pattern of armed UAV use and seek to develop 
their own capabilities. Armed UAV proliferation will become a significant issue for 
future U.S. foreign policy. If other countries use unmanned platforms against “terrorist” 
groups wherever they hide, the United States will have little to stand on if it disagrees 
with these actions.  
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The future of limited conflict will depend on future UAV policy decisions by the 
United States. The window for a secret UAV program has passed; the whole world 
knows of these tools and their capabilities. War is terrible thing and should be a last 
resort when diplomacy fails and not a quick choice when diplomacy gets difficult. War is 
a political tool, but UAVs allow a shortcut around other more expensive political tools 
that are more effective, such as aid, support and trust. 
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